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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
2\lAH Y lHl~'l'A CROFTS 
' 
Plaintiff and App<'llant, 
vs . No. 11165 
. JOSLAH HOY'l' CROFTS, 
Defendant and Rl'spo11d1d. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NA'l'URE OF THE CASE 
'L'his is an action for divorce, in which Appellant 
seeks a review and reversal by the Utah Supreme Court 
of a Deelaratory Judgment enkred herein by the Sixth 
District Court for Garfield County, Utah, on a Petition 
filed b)' Appellant for an inkrpretation of the Decree 
of Divorce entPred herein and for an Accounting by the 
Hespondent. 
OISPOSI'l'ION BY THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
FOR OARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH 
Th<> lower Court entered a Declaratory Judgment 
b,\ which it determined (a) that Respondent owed Plain-
tiff $4,5G:3.84; (h) that the $10,000.00 awarded Appellant 
hy the Dt>cree of Divorce was in lieu of all other interests 
of Appellant in any property including the rights of the 
partiPs in a home in Salt Lake City which had been sold 
and a tract of land in Pangnitch, Utah; ( c) that said 
$10,000.00 amotmt wm; payable in im;tallments at such 
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tjme m; there were actually (listribukd to and receiwd 
by Respondent profits from the sale of business asseb 
and that interest did not accrue prior to actual n'ceipt 
by Respondent of such amounts and that the said $10,-
000.0() awarded was not a judgment hearing interest; and 
l d) that the Decree of Divorce insofar as it vertained to 
the equities of the parties in the home property at Pan-
guitch was to be construed to call for a division and di~­
tribution equally between the parties onl~· after all cos to 
of sale and all outstanding indebtPdnesses against th(• 
residence had been fully satisfied. 
NATURE OF RELL1£F SOUGHrl' ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks to have the Utah Supreme 
Court reverse the Declaratory Judgment of the lower 
Court in connection with the disallowance by the lower 
Court of interest on the $10,000.00 amount awarded tu 
Appellant, the determination of the lower Court with 
respect to the balance due thereon to the Appellant, 
including the allowance by the said Court of credits 
thereon to which the Respond(mt was not entitled, the 
holding of the lower Court with respect to "equities" 
in the Panguitch home property of the parties, and the 
failure and refusal of the lower Court to require Re-
spondent to account to Appellant and to supply her with 
data covering sale of business assets and receipts of 
profits from business interests. 
STATEMEN'l' OF FACTS 
A prwllant brought an adion in OdobPr, 1 ~W2. in the 
Nixth J ndicial Distrid Court for Uarfit>ld Count~·. Ptal1. 
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sPeking a divorce from Re::;1wndent, a division of proper-
tie::;, child custody, support money and alimony, and 
attorney'::; fee::; (R. 1-2). The partie::; ::;igned a General 
.:\ ppearance of Defendant, Waiver and Agreement dated 
October ................ , 1962 (R. 3, 4, 5) and after the case 
wa::; heard by the Court on October 16, 1962, (R. 6 to 
28, hoth inclnsive), there was filed on Nov. 5, 1962, a 
Ot>neral Appearance of Defendant, vY aiver and Amended 
Agn~ernent (R. 29, 30, 31) dated October 16, 1962. Find-
ing::; of Fact and Conclusion::; of Law (R. 35, 3fi, 37) and 
a Decree of Divorce (R. 38, 39, 40) were filed November 
:,, 1%2, bearing date of October 16, 1962. The said De-
('J'ee of Divorce i::; set forth verbatim as an Appendix at 
the end of the instant Brief. 
By it::; Decree of Divorce, tlw lower Court, after di::;-
sol\'ing- the bonds of rnatrimon.v and awarding child 
cw.;tod~- to Amwllant, continued as follows (R. 38, 39): 
"I'l1 IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that the Defendant shall as-
::mme, pay, and discharge all of the outstanding 
family obligations of the parties hereto, including 
the outstanding note and mortgage upon the home 
property owned by the parties." 
'l1he home property ref erred to was and is a certain home 
at Panguitch, rtah, owned by the parties as joint tenants, 
on ~which one and only one mortgage debt existed at the 
timt> of said Decree, this being in favor of Federated 
~<>curity Life Insurance Company (R. Hi, 96, 294). 
"B'ollowing provisions relativ(' to alirnon~· an<l sup-
1,ort ltlUlH"Y tlw Comt decreed a::; follows (H. 39): . ' 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
"'I'l' IS. FURTHER OHD1~1{1£D, AD.JUDG1£D 
AND DECREI<JD that the Plaintiff is awarded a:-
a permanent, complete and final settlement of ht>r 
rights in the property of the Defendant the total 
su~ of $10,000.00, which sum shall be paid by the 
Defendant to the Plaintiff out of 1n·ofits arisino 
from business interests held by the Defendant and 
which profits are actually distributed and received 
by the Defendant and shall be immediately due 
and payable out of the sale of hm;iness ass~ts of 
the Defendant to third parties and actual n~cei1Jt 
by the Defendant of said salt> prnceeds. Said 
amount shall be pa~·able at the rate of 50 per cent 
of the gross sal(:'s proceeds until said $10,000.00 
has been paid in full. Fmther, the Defendant shall 
have the option of prepaying any part of the 
amount provided herein." 
Then followed provisions in the Decree of Divorce n)a. 
tive to an automobile, furniture and furnishings, and the 
possession, use and occupancy of tlw Panguitch home. 
described as containing 4.2 acres, more or less, (R. ::!~, 
40) and then followed this lJrovision (R. 40): 
". . . In the event the home is sold to a third 
party, the equities realized from the sale of said 
property are to be equally divided between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant. The home property 
shall be continued in joint ownership between the 
Plaintiff and Defendant until said ownership i~ 
terminated by a sale to a third party as is hen•i11 
provided." 
Appellant's Petition for Interpretation of Decree of 
Divorce and to Have Ddendant Render an Accounting 
(R. 42, 43, 44, 45) sought an interpretation by the Court 
of the Decree of Divorce and that it determine (a) that 
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in vil,W of the fact that Hespondent was ordered to pay 
all outstanding family obligations, including the outstand-
ing note and mortgage upon the home property, that said 
mortgage debt should not be deductible from gross sale 
proceeds of the Panguitch home in making a division of 
such proceeds between the parties; ( b) that Plaintiff was 
entitled to eight (8) per cent interest on the $10,000.00 
awarded to her by the Decree of Divorce from the date 
of the entry thereof until said smn was paid; and (c) that 
Hespondent be ordered to show cause why he should 
not account to Appellant for profits arising from busi-
ness interests held by Respondent and distributed to him 
or subject to distribution upon his request and for the 
sale of any business interests of Respondent, including 
thl• sale price, the proceeds received, and any proceeds 
not received but payable to him. An Order to Show 
Cause and 8etting Time for Hearing (R. 46, 47, 48) was 
i::osued and served pursuant to said Petition. 
Various proceedings were then conducted and hear-
ings held, the record and transcripts of which appear 
in the Record on Appeal (R. 49 to 311, both inclusive) 
and there was then entered an A.MENDED DECISION 
(R. 312, 313, 314, 315) dated Nov. 29, 1967. The original 
Decision was not filed and of course is not a part of the 
Hecord on Appeal. The Court then entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 316, 317, 318, 319, 
320) and its Declaratory Judgment (R. 321, 322, 323) 
from which Judgment tlH• instant appeal was taken by 
Appellant. 
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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE $10,000.00 SUl\l AWARDED APPELLANT BY 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS PAYABLE IN 
INSTALLMENTS AT SUCH TIME AS THERE WERE 
ACTUALLY DISTRIBUTED TO AND RECEIVED BY 
THE RESPONDENT PROFITS FROl\I THE SALE OF 
BUSINESS ASSETS, THAT INTEREST THEREON 
DID NOT ACCRUE PRIOR TO ACTUAL RECEIPT 
BY RESPONDENT OF ANY OF SUCH AMOUNTS, 
AND THAT SAID $10,000.00 AWARD WAS NOT A 
JUDGMENT. 
By ih; Declaratory .J ndgrnrnt, thl' Court stated tl1at 
Uw $10,000.00 award \\'as pa>·ahl!· sole!>- ont of "profit:-
from the sale of business assl'ts" receivl'd h>- tlw Rt'-
spondent (R. 322). 1'his obviously and flagrantly in con-
flict with the Decree of Dirnrce thl' prnvisions of "·hich 
are 4uoted in the 8taternent of Facts above on this point 
and a copy of which is attached hereto as an Appendix. 
Certainly, it is trne that nndPr tht> guise of interpreting 
a Decree, thP Court is not permitted to completely re-
vise and alter the sanw, bnt this is Pxactly what the lower 
Court has done on both this and otlwr points and Jll'OYi-
s1ons. 
In connection "·itli tlH· qtwstion as to \\'hetlwr or not 
the $10,000.00 award was a jn<lgrnent, bParing interest 
from its date at ~~~ ]Jl'r annum \\ P submit that thi' 
1:llllOlmt as set forth in thP D<•en~P of Divorce ,,-as and i' 
a sum certain and is a jn<lg11H'nt lwaring interest frolll 
ifa datP urnkr tlw La\\'s of Ptali. rr11P language of tlw 
Dt>cn'<' is significaut: 
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"l'I' 1:--l B'UH'l'HJ~R OHD1£Rl£D, ADJUDGED 
AND DJ£CREJ£D that the Plaintiff is awarded as 
~ pennanPnt and final :,;ettlement of her rights 
m the property of the Defendant, the total sum 
of $10,000.00 .... " (R. 39). 
At thi8 point, could there be any doubt that this was and 
is a judgment bearing interesU Additional language fol-
lowed, but it merely did two things: (1) it specified out 
uf what funds or sources the judgment was to be paid, 
namely, from all "1Jrofits arising from business interests 
held by the Defendant" and 50% of gross sales proceeds 
"out of the sale of business assets of the Defendant; and 
(2) it gave the Defendant the "option of prepaying any 
iiart of the amount provided herein." (R 39). These pro-
visions did not restrict, modify or lessen the effect of, 
the award as a sum certain, which would bear interest 
at 8% under Utah Statutes. 
Rule 54 of the Utah Ritle.s of Civil Procedure pro-
Yides as follows: 
"Definition: Form. 'Judgment' as used in these 
Rules includes a decree and any order from which 
an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings the report of a master, or the 
record of prior proceedings." 
In the case of Robin.soil 'U. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 
;'520, 109, 817, a judgment is defined as follows: 
"The statute does not n~qnire a judgment to be 
in an~' particular form. Ordinarily a judgme~t 
is snfficiPnt if hy the nse of proper language_ it 
is stakd what tJH' prp\·ailing party shall n•ceJYP 
and what tliL· lo:,;ing party is re(1 uired to do, pay 
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u~· disl'harg1·. and i11 that \\a.' adjudi(·at1·:-: and 
(hsposP:-: of thP matkr:-: in eontron·r:-:'"" 
~ection 15-1-±, Ct uh Code A 111wtutcrl 195:l, lH'o\·i<b 
as follows: 
··Jntcrcst 011 i11((r;111c11f,, . ... An> judgmL·nt n·n-
dered on a lawfnl eontract shall conform thento 
and .shall ~ear the inten-'st agrePd upon hy th1· 
parties, wluch shall be SJ H'cifi Pd in thP j udgmPnt: 
othe1· judg:nwnb shall hPar intPrP:-:t at tht> rah' of 
eight iwr et>nt iwr annum." 
ln Arnold 1. Arnold. 1-1-0 X\Y~d ~l-1:. at pag(· :--;77 (:11 
tlH· Iowa ('on rt hdd: 
"\Ve an· satisfiPd fixed a\\ ards of 1110nn for ehil<l 
support, alimon.\' and 1n·o iwrt~- st>ttle1;1Pn t dra\\' 
interest at fivP J!Pl' <'ent ]'Pl' annum from datP of 
jndgmt>nt. 01· in <·asp ol' sjw<.'ifie 1w1·iodie pa»-
ments, frorn da tP Pa<.'h :-:ueh pa,n1wnt bt><'OlllP~ 
due and O\\·ing .. (antl10ritiPs) .. ~'urthermore, 
this rnle ap]Jlit>:-: p\·pn though thP jndgrnPnt itself 
fails to make n•frn·m·p to tli1· matter of intert>st. 
PagP ~rnU>) "I\': HaYing ddenuinPd a judgmt>nt 
or decrPP in a divorcP action a\\'arding money in 
a sum or sums certain or capablt> of a::>cPrtain-
nwnt from tlw judguwnt or dP<.'l't'!\ draw intert>st 
until paid. \\' P 1n·oeePd 1wxt to a eon::>ideration 
of the pffpd an ap]H•al llHl>' Jia,·1· upon right to 
8\lCh infrl'(-'8t." 
The Deel'P!' in tlH· instant ease provides a sulll et>l'· 
tai11 and tlwn lllPl'Pl> <'ontin11Ps to prn\·idP for payment 
ont of cPrtain som·e(•:-:. lt doPs not makl' the judgrnt>nt 
payahlP in instalh11P11ts and in fixPd periodi<· datPs a~ 
was dorn· with 1·e::;1wd to tlw ali!lloll.' and snpport 1t101w~ 
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;i\\·ardPd. It is so111t'\\·hat similar to a demonstrativ 1 ~ 
lq~acy whieh Wordl-' and PhrasPt-', \'ohtme 12, page 6S, 
'!Pf i nes as follows: 
"A 'dernon::;tratiw legacy' i::; one given with refer-
Pn?e .to a particular fund only for purpose::; of 
pomtmg out a convenient method of payment and 
wherein legatee will not be disappointed though 
the fund totally fails. Probate Code Sec. 161. In 
re Cline's ~::;tate, 155 P.:2d 390, 393, 67 Cal. App. 
2d 800." 
One of tlw mo::;t important and significant provisions 
of the Decree of Divorce with re::;pect to this question is 
found in the provision that the defendant shall have the 
u1;tio1l of prepaying a11y part of the amount provided 
herein (R. 39). What possible reason could there be for 
this provision in favor of the Re::;pondent other than 
lo enabh· him to halt the running of intere::;t on the 
$10,000.00 awarded Appellant'? If that provision has any 
1mrpo::;(~ behind it, and it must be assumed that it was 
not included for the pnrpose of being meaningless, then 
it was to enable Respondent to avoid further interest by 
"prepaying" so that he could use any funds available 
(and not mere l~- those from hnsines::; profits or from 
:>0% of gro::;s sales proceeds). 
rrhe lower Court failed utterly to distinguish between 
a prop1·rt~· settlement award and an award of alimony or 
support money payable in periodic installments. Cer-
tainly, the alimony and support money amounts did not 
rlraw interPst at least nntil thPy matured. The cases 
110lding that intt·n·d does not apply on award::; in di\'On:e 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
ea::-;e::-; are limited in::-;ofar a::-; WP can dt>tPnuiiw, to situa-
tion::-; involving 1wriodic in::-;tallment::-; duP as alirnon~ 01 
:o-npport money. Bnt that is entirely diff Prent frorn a 
property settlement award and/or an award of' alirnon: 
in gross and thP courts haw so JH--ld. 1'hP $10,000.011 
<.mount is not even alirnon>· in gross, which clearly would 
bear interest. It is rnon, than that - it is a ::-;ettlt>111Pnt 
and award of Plaintiff's interest in lwr husband's prop 
~·rty settlement and is not alimony. 
We are fully cognizant that the l~tah ~u1m--1w· Court 
has held in Cole v::;. Cole (1942) 101 Utah 355, 122 P2d 
201, that periodic alimony and support money in::-;tall-
ments do not bear interest until dut>. Thi::-; part of thl' 
ruling in said case is limited to such items payahlt> in 
installments and is so constrned in being cited in 33 
ALR2d 1457. It is significant and intert>::-;ting to notP that 
in the Cole case, the Court goes on to discm;s a propert: 
settlement award and uses this language: 
"On May 19, 193<i, the de('rel' granting .MargueritP 
D. Cole the sum of $1,037.50, being one-half of tlw 
value of the couunnnit~- propert~- was t>ntered. Th<' 
first payment in the amount of $250, was not madP 
until Januan· 19, 1938. Subsequent payment~ 
were made as heretofore set forth. The amount 
having bf~en fixed by decrpe of tlw court, interpst 
should be allowed from the date of tht> decree to 
thP date tlw ehe<'ks wt>n• dPlivered .... " 
In the Decree in the Cole casP, nothing was said 
about intert>st. A jndgrnPnt antornatieally bears intPrPst 
nndPT thP Utah Code. SPP :-m A111 .• htr (l1iterest) See. :24. 
1 '· :!~~ \\·hi('l1 .-,;tatP~ tlint undn ~1wli a ~tatut(', int .. n·~t 
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\\·ill he applied or implied although th1· ,judgrnPnt ibwlf i~ 
silent on the point. 
Anoth1c~r l!tah case of importance in our ::;ituation is 
Reeslcy i:. Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 P. 458, in which the 
( 'omt considered the Utah Statutes relative to whether 
or not a divorce decree vroviding for installment pay-
ments of alimony constituted a lien against the property 
of the person required to pay. After quoting the Statute 
upplieable to judgment liens, the Court held: 
''When a divorce is grantt>d and the husband 
ordered to pay alimony or to support minor chil-
dren or both, and the decree itself does not declare 
or impress a lien to secure such payments, then, 
by force of the statute relating to judgments in 
general, such decree or judgment from the filing 
and docketing thereof becomes and has all the 
force and effect of a lien to the same extent as an 
ordinary judgment for money, when the decree 
for alimony is in a gross sum, though payablt~ 
partly or wholly in future installments, and when 
not in a gross sum but, as here, in installments for 
an indefinite period, the decree is a lien securing 
payment of all due and unpaid installments, but 
not of installments to become due in the future. 
By the weight of authority, and as we think the 
better reason, although there are cases to the con-
trary, a decree for alimony in a gross sum as well 
as to past due and unpaid installments stands upon 
the same footing as ordinary money judgments. 
" 
.. .''A judgment or decree awarding '.1-limony in a 
grnss sm11 though payahlP in futi.ire 1m;tall11wnt::;, 
is neYerthl'le::;::; definite and certam as to the ::;urn 
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of morn-'y to lw paid. So ii,; a d!'Cl"\'(' a:,; to iiast-dut· 
and unpaid installments ... " 
If tlw .Judg11wnt in the Bcc::;lcy cas(• constituted a 
lien, then certainly a pro1wrty settle11wnt jndg111Pnt fixing 
a certain sum as hPing dnP Appellant, regardless of 
sources out of "\Vhich it is to he paid and partieularh 
where the judgment debtor has a riirht of lll'eJJaVlllPnt 
h . ' 
is a judgment constituting a liPn and hParing intereRt 
nnder the Utah Code. From tlH' standpoint of jnstict, 
it should be lwld to lw such a jndg·11wnt, parti<'nlarly 
where, as in our instant case, the Defendant rdaint>J 
all of the business property. 'L'lw award to Ap1it>llant 
represented her share in that lJrofit-prodncing business 
propert~·, which wali h•pt as an intPgrntt>d mass for 
Respondent's benefit. J1~rom this, he would receiw all 
benefits and profit8, and A ppdlant'8 only bt>nefit from it 
was the accrual of inten•st on the jr;_dgmPnt duP lll'r. 
·POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING 
THAT THE DECREE OF DIVORCE BE DETER-
MINED TO MEAN THAT THE EQUITIES IN THE 
HOME AT PANGUITCH, UTAH, WERE TO BE DI-
VIDED AND DISTRIBUTED EQUALLY BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES ONLY AFTER ALL COSTS OF SALE 
AND ALL OUT ST ANDING I N D E B T E D N E S S 
AGAINST SAID HOME WERE FULLY SATISFIED. 
It is impo8siblP for App<-·llant to ddt~r111ine the mean· 
ing of the lower Court'8 Declarator~· .J ndgment on tlw 
que8tion of eqnitie8 in tlw Pangnikh home. We 4uotf· 
from 8aid .Judgment (R 322, :323): 
"D. Fr TS F'lTHTIH~l{ ~\D.JUDICA 11I<~D that the 
DPcrel' of N ovP11tlwr G, 191i:2, is interprPkd and 
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detenuinPd to mean that the \~qnitie:::; in the home 
an• to be_ divided and distributed equally between 
the parties only after all costs and expenses of 
sal~ and all out:::;tanding indebtedne:::;s against the 
residence have been fully :::;atisfied." 
Suppo:::;edly, the Declaratory .J ndgment wa:::; an inter-
11rdation of the Decree of Divorce, but we feel that the 
Declaratory .J udginent itself needs to be interpreted. 
ln the first plact-, it use:::; the word ''indebtednesses" 
which would ref er to rnort- than one debt, but the Decree 
( R. 38, 39) refers to onl~- one note and mortgage and 
uses this language: 
"Fl' IS FURTHER ORDER1£D, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that the Defendant shall as-
sume, pay and discharge all of the outstanding 
family obligations of the parties hereto, including 
the outstanding note and mortgage upon the home 
property owned by the parties." 
By it:::; Declaratory Judgment, the lower Court has, once 
again, completely changed the provisions of the Decree. 
'rh words "outstanding note and mortgage" have been 
ehanged to "indebtednesses" and, if we understand the 
~ourt correctly, the Appellant is to be made to stand half 
of not only the ''outstanding note and mortgage upon the 
l1ome property'' but also half of "all outstanding indebt-
Pdnesses against the residence" even though the Respond-
ent was ordered to assume, pay and discharge all of the 
dPbts, including the "outstanding notP and mortgage upon 
the home property owned by the parties." 
'l1he record shows that tlwrP was only onP mortgagP 
Jebt on the home pro1Jerty wheu the Dt>cree wa:::; signed 
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and entered, that L<~ing u\w Fed<~ral S<·curitY ln8ura 11 t:l' 
Company. (R. Hi, 9G, 294) and tlH· Court it~Plf at pag1· 
9G of the Record on Avpeal rt>ferred to "th<· t>xistino 
b 
debt" thereon. However, Re81Jond<~nt ltas now 8ougltt 
to mtroduce a new, separatt> and distind "enct1111lna11c"" 
against the homl' in thl' form of a pro111i880l'!' note sig1wd 
by the parties to J. K Crofts & Sons (H. S5, Sfi) and 
which was not secured by a mortgagP. lndPed, H<·spoml-
rnt through his courn;el :-;tipnlat<·d (R. :2~J-!) that wht-n tliv 
divorce ·was granted th\:'I·e was only one lllortgag<' again~t 
the home property filed of n·cord and that this was to 
.F'ederated 8Pcurity. He tlwn conknded, however, that 
there was a note signed by the parties to J. K Croft~ 
and Sons, which was for lllah~rials and labor that \\·pnt 
into the home. Certainly, it would torture thP Dt•en·p 
beyond recognition to hold, as ap1mrentl!· thP lo\\'Pl' Conrt 
bas now done, that this was a rnortgagP on tltt• h01w· 
property, particularly in view of tlw fact that thP Deen"l' 
refened to only one lllortgage, being thP on!:' to b'ed!:'rair'd 
Security Insurance Cornpan!-, and the Hespond!:'nt wa~ 
ordt>red to pa,\' all falllil!· dPhts, including that notP and 
mortgage. One of the debts ht> ·wa8 thus and tlH·rPh:· 
ordered to pay was tlw note to ,J. l~. Croft8 and Soni->, hut 
now he s<·<'ks to hav<· tli<• Ap1H'llant pay half of tlw sanw, 
and bY using th<' wonl in tlw plural SPHH' ( imkhted-
1wsses0) it appears that thP lcnn'r Court, ('ith<·r inkn-
tionaUy or inadYPrkntl!T, has g01w along: with his <'Oll-
t<'ntions. 
'l1he Declaratory .Judg111Pnt is nm·Prtain, ineornplek 
and indt>finik in that it <loPs nut SlJPll out Pxaetl.\' what 
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i:,: lwing- refened to in thi::; connection. Nor doe::; it ::;tat!:' 
when or in \\'hat mann!:'r ''equitie::;'' are to he dett>rmined. 
'l'ltP:,:l' questions 1Jl"l'8ent themselve::;: 
(l) ln vie\~ of tl_1e order that Re::;pondent pay all 
debt::;, mcludmg tlw mortgage on the family 
home at Panguitch, are "equities" to be deter-
mined by deducting from the grm;::; sale price 
whtm the propert)r i::; sold the costs of ::;ale~ If so, 
then after making ::;nch deduction, the net pro-
ceeds wonld be di,,ided P(piall:· since the propPrty 
is held hy the parties as joint tenants. 
( :2) \i\Then the home is sold, are "equities" to be de-
termined by deducting at that time the costs of 
::;ale and all of the balance the 11 remaining dne 
Federated Security Insurance Company on its 
mortgage loan'? We a::;::;ume that Respondent has 
kept up the payments to Federated and that the 
present balance is ::;nbstantially less than the 
amount due in October and November, 19G2. On 
the assumption that he continues to make thP 
pay:nwnts to Federated, the mortgage debt will 
be still le::;s when the property is sold. 
We cannot believe that Respondent seriously con-
tPnds that the obligation to .J. E. Crofts and Sons should 
hl' deducted in arriving at "equities." Actually, this debt, 
onp of those as:mmed by Respondent and which he agreed 
to pa)· and discharge, matnred April 30, 1966 (Exhibit 
"('" following R. 91) and we assume it ha::; been paid 
punmant to the Decree of Divorce, but whether or not it 
has bPen paid, it is clearly a debt Respondent was ordered 
to pay as one of "all of the outstanding family obliga-
tions" and certainly was not a mortgagP dPbt agaim,;t the 
liol!H' hut ~\\'as llH='rely an unsecnn='d note of the partie::;. 
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We cite Pic1so11 c. Hall, 18~ ~o. ()/~l, US l•'Ja. W±, aud 
Des Mui11es Joint Stock La11d Ba11k 1. Alln1, llil NW 9U. 
~20 Iowa -1-!S, in ('OilnPttion with this point. 
The Declaratory .J ndgrnent is tl<ofretivv in not ddPr-
mining vVHEN or ho\v "<'quities" an· to ht• detPrmirn·d. 
Vv e feel that point must be clea1'ed up. TherP an_. thni 
lJOSsibilitit>s, namely, ( 1) only costs of sale arP to lw 
deducted in dt>termining "Ptluities" in tlw home; (~I 
"equitil's" al'(' to lw detPnuined h.v dl·duding t'rolll gro~' 
salt> proct>eds the cm;ts of salt· and tlH· amount due Fed-
rated when the Decree was entered; or (3) "t:>quities" an: 
to be determined by dt•ducting front gross ::mle procet>cb 
from the home property the costs of ::mle and the halanrP 
remaining dne Federated Secnrit:· Insurance Compan) 
at the tirne of sale. We sulnnit that the first possibility 
i::- the correct one since Rt·spondPnt was ordl·red to pa) 
th(:' mortgage debt. If tlH-' howP had been sold tlw da.1 
after the Decree was enten•d, it was Hespondent's duty to 
pay the mortgagP debt in full. To hold otlwrn-iti<' would 
mean that Ap1Jellant would hP pa:·ing 01w-half of a dt>ht 
Respondent was order<'d to pa:·. rrlu· Court's direction 
that he pay "all" of the dPhts, ineluding this one, wonld 
thereby hl'couie meaningless. 
Even if tlw "equitiPs' 'are dd(-'J'lt1i1wd at tlu· tiuw 11! 
sale hv deducting costs of :-,;ale and thP balam·P r(:'ntainin~ 
due at that tirnc to E'ederated it \\'ill ml·an that Appellant 
is heing requin~d tlwreby to pay orn·-lialf of the tiaid n-
maining dPht and that tlw langtiage of thl~ DP('I'(~e is being 
ignort'd h(•eallS(' H<·spond(•nt is not lwi11g n·qnin·d tu IJU) 
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all of the ialllil!· ohligation::o, including thi::o one. The word 
'eq1titi1•s" must he interpreted in the light of all provi-
.~ions in tlw DPcree. It is fundamental that the Court 
illltst give t-ff ect to each and every provision in the De-
1·rPI', in the light of and with relationship to each other. 
If tl1i:-; i,; donl', thPn tlw lowPr Court's interpretation, WP 
:-;nlm1it. i,; ohyiousl~' incorrect. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT THE AMOUNT OWED BY RESPONDENT TO 
APPELLANT AS OF THE DATE OF ITS DECLARA-
TORY JUDGMENT WAS $4,563.84, AND IN ALLOW-
ING RESPONDENT CREDIT FOR $1,271.14 AND 
$350.00 RECEIVED FROM THE SALES OF APPEL-
LANT'S INTEREST IN A SALT LAKE CITY HOME 
AND A PANGUITCH PASTURE OWNED AND HELD 
BY THE PARTIES AS JOINT TENANTS. 
At tlH~ tinH· the DecreP of Divorce was dated and 
1·ntrt>d (Oct. lG and Nov. 5, 1962, respectively) the parties 
11·ere the ownPrs as joint tenants of certain pasture prop-
1·1-ty in Panguitch, Utah, adjoining their Panguitch home 
1 •ropPrt!', and \VPre entitled to funds from the sale by 
ll11·1t1 of a Salt Lake City home held and owned by them as 
,joint t1•nanb (R. 81, 178, 179, 258, 259, 302). Respondent 
a:< joint tnans (R. 81, 178, 258, 259, 302). Respondent 
<"iaim1·d crt>dit on the $10,000.00 awarded to Appellant 
\'or th1• smn of $1,271.14 representing Appellant's one-
\1alf ot' tlw final payment on the sale of the Salt Lake City 
l10111P and also for the sum of $350.00 representing one-
half of thP sal<· price of the Panguitch pastnre, which 
one-half was hPr own pro]l<'rty. Th<~ lowPr Court allowPd 
th:<(· as propi·r 1·rl:'dits on tlH~ auwnnts due nnder the 
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Decree of Divorce in dPt('nniuing tlw rwt balante remaill-
ing due by Resvondent to Appellant on the $10,000.0U, 
which balance was determined without charging R~­
spondent with an:· interest whah;oever on thP $10,000.0U 
amount ou either the theory that it was a judgnwnt 
bParing interest from its date at ~% or that at the nry 
minimum interest was dm~ on and as installmenb ma-
tured and become payable thereon h :- \-i rtue of the real-
ization by Respondent of profits frow business intl>rest1 
held by him or of gross sales prncePds from the sale of 
business assets. 
In other words, the Appellant has been charged and 
the Respondent has bern credited ·with vroperties and 
amounts actually owned by the Appellant ·when the Di-
yorce was granted. The Decree of Divorce does not 
justify or permit under any possible logical construction 
any such result. There would have been just as mncl1 
logic and reason to charge Appellant and to Credit Re-
spondent with any other itt~m of property such as an 
automobile, jewelry, or any other asset owm•d b:-· App<'l-
lant at the time of the Divorce whether or not or when-
ever the same was sold by her and tonvt>rtt•d into cash. 
The Decree of Divorce does not mention at any point nor 
does the Pntire Record on Appeal which is the compMt· 
record, ref er in any way to Panguitch pasture, the owner-
ship or disposition thereof, or the halante dm-· from tlw 
imle of the Salt Lake City home owned by the parti<'~ 
as joint tenants. The Panguitch property adjoined the 
J'anguitcl1 horn<' JH'Opl·rt~- hel<l hy the parties as joint 
t(•nanb and wl1iel1 \1·a:-: onkn·d (·ontint\('<l in St[('lt joint 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1111 n1·n;hip u11til sold. The ~alt Lak(• City home held in 
joint te1rnm·y until sale had been sold and the proceeds 
wen· payablP to both of the parties. The Decree did not 
tah awa~· from th!:' Ap[H'llant any property in her name 
11r already ownPd by her, and this would include the 
Pang·11ikh pasture and tlw balance on the Salt Lake City 
liom1·, but tlw lower Comt, b~· its Declaratory Judgment 
lias now seen fit to change the Decn•P of Divorce and to 
tah awa.' from tlH· Ap1H'llant part of her property by 
1·harging Respondent with receipts from the sale of her 
own prnpPrt)·. CPrtainly this was not contemplated by 
t!H· Decn·P and was not even mentioned. The Court's 
Deelarator~· .J udgnwnt hy its eff Pct and b.'· the allowancP 
ur thPse credits, introduces entirely new items into the 
action, and, wornP still, takes from the Appellant and 
gives to the Respondent part of thP Appellant's property. 
nil without an,\ ('onsich·ration whatsoever. 
'rhPre was sowP evidene\~ l'P lativ(• to thesL· particular 
itPnts at onP of tlw lwarings on the Petition for Interpre-
tation of the DecrPe, sincP Resj)OndPnt had claimed them 
in thv nnverifiPd, incomplete and erroneous accounting 
iiP had filed with tlw Court (R. 87, 88, and 89), thesP 
particular it!:'ms lwing listed as thP second April 10, 1963 
itPm in tlw amount of $1,271.lG and as the third April 
10, 19();3 i h•111 of $350.00. Such Pvidence was completely 
i11eo11clusiw in that Appellant stated that she received 
hoth pa~·111!:'nb and gave lwr eoo1wration in the sale of 
tltP Panguiteh pastnn• with thP understanding and on 
1hP eondition that tht>y did not appl.'' on tlH• $10,000.00 
:111ard (I{. J/,'-i, 17~J. :m'.2. :~)();{) a11<l tlw Jfr~pondP11t tP~ti-
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fied to tlw (·untrar:· ~H. :2:-):2-2()(), irwl.). \\'(• frel tliai 
eertainl:· the App('llant\.: te:-;tii11011.\ i:-; rntitl(•d to lllll('li 
more eredPnCP, lwcam;(' it l'\'Pllll' onl:· logieal that sl1t· 
would not b(• allowing or agTePinµ: to a crPdit on thi· 
$10,000.00 from tlw sale of lwr own properti(•::;. :She had 
n11 t<ndivided one-half intPl'Pst as a joint tenant in tlH·~1· 
properties and in tlw l)}'Oee('ds then•frorn and th!:';;(• in-
tt>rests WPre jn:st a:s much pro1wrty right;; \'Psted in hPr 
as were items of pro1wrty :separatd:· lwld or owned 
by her, whatt•ver they might han· lwt•n, at the tirne of 
the Divorce . 
Furthermore, it 1:s an elementary principh· of la11 
which requires no eitations of authority, that e\·pn if 
she had agreed to any :such applif'ation and credit, whirli 
we vigorously dispntP and d<:>ny, no con:sideration for an) 
such agreement, credit or application was paid h.\' lk 
spondent or rPceived b:· A]Jpellant, \\·ithont \Yhieh an1 
such agreement would fail and he void. 
The entire matter, furtlu·n11on·, is n•1110ved from any 
peradventun-· of doubt by th(• l'Xpn·;;:,; wording of th~ 
Decree of Divorc<' itself which state:s ( R. ;)9) that th~ 
"Plaintiff shall be award<:>d the total sum of $10,000.00, 
which shall he paid by the Defrndant to the Plaintiff 
out of profits arisi11g from business i11tcrests held by tlw 
Defendant" ... and ... out of the sale of lntsi111'ss assets 
of the Defendant to third parties . ..... 'J'he award of 
$10,00000 (vlus interPst) was vayahlt•, therl'for, out of 
Dt>fendant's profits from hi~ prop('rty and out of the 
sale of his husinl'~S as~wt~. 'l'o wab· tlii~ arnotrnt or <lllY 
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part of it pa,\·alJJp out of Appellant's lJl'Operty i::; a trav-
e;-;ty \\'hi('h should not hP countenanced by any Court. 
F'mthl'rmore tl1P Decree stated that the settlement was 
of "the rights of the Plaintiff in the property of t-he 
Dcfrndaut'" (R. :i9) and it wa::; not a ::;ettlernent of Plain-
tiff's rights in her own property nor did it award the 
Re::;pondt'nt an_,. righb in the propert~· of the Appellant. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING 
RESPONDENT TO ACCOUNT TO APPELLANT AND 
TO SUPPLY HER WITH DATA COVERING THE 
SALE OF BUSINESS ASSETS, DATES AND 
AMOUNTS INVOLVED, DATES OF RECEIPT BY 
RESPONDENT, AND SIMILAR DATA WITH RE-
SPECT TO PROFITS RECEIVED BY THE RE-
SPONDENT. 
By the term::; of the Deeree of Divorce quoted above, 
it wa::; ::;pecificalJ~· vrovided that the $10,000.00 was pay-
abl(' out of profits received by Defendant-Respondent 
from bnsiness interests held by him (all of said profits) 
an<l wa::; immediately due out "of the sale of business 
assets of the Defendant to third varties and actual re-
t·eipt by tht- Defendant of said sale proceedings" with 
thP further provision that payments out of gross sales 
1n·oct-t-ds were to be at the rate of 50% thereof (R. 39). 
l~wn if it wert- lwld that this $10,000.00 award was not a 
.iud6'11lt-nt. ht'aring interest which we respect.fully con-
trnd would ht- erroneous there is no possible doubt but 
11 hat intt-rt>st would start accrning when and as Re-
~pondent n•ceived profits from business interests or 
"gross salt-s in·o<·t-eds" fro111 salP of hnsiness assets to 
third partiPs. It follows, tl1t•refon·, that A1Jpellant is 
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l'lltitlt>d to know the <·xad dates, a11101mb and otlwr dat~ 
with rP::-;lJect to sud1 profih; and sal<·s. Appellant sough! 
at tht:> first hearing on h\:'r PPtition to ltav<' tlw Court 
order that Respondent he requiu•d to submit a halane1· 
:::heet showing assets when the Deel'<'<' wa::-; entered, in 
order that there would ht> a beginning point and slw could 
then detennine whethl'r or not profits had lwPn rPalized 
from ::-;uch husine::-;s interests or ::-;alPs then·of had bet·n 
madt:>. 1'lw lower Conrt rt>fnsed this n•qtwst, which wa.' 
l'\:'!)eated a number of times (R. G8, fi9, 70, 71, 7:2, 7:3, 74. 
75). Snb::w<11wnt dforts wen-' also mad<', hut to no avail. 
By its Amended Dt:>cision, the lower Court recognizPd 
(R. 315) that at thP very least the Appt:>llant ·was entit!Pd 
to interest from the respectiYe dates payments hecauw 
due to her by virtue of the receipt by Respondent of 
business profits or gross sall·s proceeds, and specifically 
directed as follows : 
"The Defendant is therefore reqnin<l to supph 
Plaintiff such enabling data." 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lair 
( R. 316, 317, 318, 319) the lower Court almost complete!) 
reversed its field by stating (R. 318) that the $10,000.00 
amount was payable "out of profits arising from the sal~ 
to third parties of business interests held by the De-
fendant" hut then again rewn;ed itself by saying that 
fi0% of the gross sales proceeds of business assets which 
\Vere actually distributed to and rPceived by tlw Defend-
ant were to he paid to th(• Plaintiff irnmediat<:>ly bnt not 
earlier;" and cornpldei)' ig-norPd thP effect of the r<"aliza-
t ion of lrnsi1wss lJrnfits n·quiring pa:·rnl'11ts to appl: 011 
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tlw $10,000.0U award. ln it:,; Conclnsiorn; of Law (R. 319) 
tlt\' lo11·pr Court affinnatiwly found that no interest was 
<ltH' 011 tlw $4,563.84 prior to the actual receipt by De-
1 Pndant of those amounts." This did not define what or 
\I hieh amounts \\'\-']"(' hPing n"ft.rred to, nor is there any 
l'inding as to when an.\ sn<'li amonnts \\'Prt' rPalized and 
~tartPd to lwar interPst. 
At the ver;.· worst and mo::;t unfavorable interpreta-
t ioll of tlH· DPcrPe irn;ofar as Hespondent is concerned 
11·itl1 n•spPct to said $10,000.00 arnonnt, payments thereon 
111ahll'Pd and interest started to accrue thereon whenever 
und in whatevPr stuns RPspondent received either profits 
from business interests lwld b~· him (which would in-
dttd\' intt>rest, dividends, profits frorn the operation of 
his own business assets, distributions to him by partner-
ships or corporations of profits, etc.) and whenever he 
rPalized gross sales proceeds from selling business assets, 
50% of which gross sales proceds ·wonld be payable to 
,~ppellant. 
By its Declarator» Judgment, the lower Court ig-
nored cornpletPly the duty to pay out of business profits 
and changed without any possible justification the pro-
1·ision relative to paymt>nt ont of 50% of "gross sales 
prnePPds" hy sa.Ying that tlw payments were due only out 
of "'profits from the sale of business assets." There 
is a gTPat deal of difference hetwPPn "profits from the 
~alP of bn::;inPss assPts" and ''gross salPs proceeds." By 
appl~·ing tlw Iath•r, it drH'sn't rnatt<>r \l'l1dhPr then· is a 
jJrofit or Joss 011 tltt> sale. B.\ applying the former, sale 
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price would bt' ignon·d and a d<·knuination would hi· 
made of "profits" or "gain." Indet>d, RP:,.;pondent hai 
endeavored in hi:,.; Accounting (R. 90) to twist "gr08, 
receipts" from sales into one-half of long-tPnu capital 
gain. 
At no time has Appellant had tlw bem·fit of an 
accounting by Res1Jondent of profits from bu:oine:,.;:,.; in-
terests or of gross salt's proeeeds from lnrnines:,.; assets. 
The lower Court reeognized her right to :,.;uch an Account-
ing, but then entered a Dt>claratory Judgment and made 
oral Orders which completely depriw her of :,.;uch right. 
In order to s1wll out what Appellant dl'sired and 
was entitled to under any pos:,.;ible interpretation of the 
Decree of Divorce, she served on Re:,.;pondent a Reque8t 
and Notiee (R. 148, 149, 150, 151) :,.;etting forth a li:,.;t of 
the documents which would disclose profits and gros~ 
sales proceeds, specifically listing information and docn-
ments desired. The Respondent refused to a1Jply these 
items and the Court -would not make an order ret1niring 
him to do so. Appellant's rights to an accounting to 
disclose information to which she was clearly entitled 
and her right to documents solely and exclusively within 
the knowledge and po:,.;session of the Respondent hav1' 
been ignored and circumvented hy thP RPspondent and 
by the lower Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant r<>spectfully {'Onh•nds that the so-called 
Declaratory .JudgrnPnt of tht• lower Conrt be reversed 
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and alte1wl to provide that the $10,000.00 award in favor 
oJ' Appellant was a judgment bearing interest at 8% 
1wr annum from the date it was entered and determining 
1l1P correct amount due thereon; that the Court deter-
minP that "equities" in the home property at Panguitch 
be defined to mean gross sales proceeds less expenses 
of sale and that the net proceeds thus determined be 
ordered paid equally to the parties on the sale of said 
!tome; that the Court disallow Respondent credit on the 
$10,000.00 award for the sum of $1,271.14 and $350.00 
111entioned in Point Ill; and the Respondent be required, 
in the event the Court rules that said $10,000.00 award 
\las not a judgmPnt bearing interest at 8 per cent per 
annum from its date, to account for the dates, amounts 
and sources of all profits from business interests and 
gross proceeds from sales of business assets since the 
decree and that a determination then be made of the 
correct amount due Appellant after applying each pay-
ment first to interest accrued to the date thereof and the 
balance to principal. 
J{espectfully submitted, 
.\IATTSSON & JACKSON 
151 North Main 
Hichfield, Utah 
GUSTIN & RICHARD~ 
1610 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX 
lN 'l'HJ~ DIS'l'Rll'T COURT OF 
GARFIELD COlTN'l'Y, STA'L'E OF UTAH 
MARY IR~'l'A CROFTS, 
p la i II ti ff. 
- VS -




CIVIL NO. 18SI 
This matter eamP on for 1H.~aring bPfore thP Court. 
the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, District JndgP, pn· 
siding without a jury, on the Hitl1 da:· of October, A.D. 
1962 at Richfield, Utah, upon tlw complaint of the Plain· 
tiff, and upon th~~ General AppearancP, Waiver and 
Agreement of the Defendant on fik 11PrPin. ThP Plaintiff 
appeared in person and by h<'r Connsd 'l'Px R. Olsen of 
the Law Firm of Ols1•n and l'hamh1..•rlain, and the D('· 
fendant did not appear in iwrson or by coimst>l and it 
appearing that the DPfondant had been duly served witl1 
a copy of thP eornplaint and that ]I(' had rnt<•rPd a O<>neral 
j .. ppearanee, \iVain'r andAgrPl'lll<'Ilt, wlH•reinlte withdl'P\I 
his answer and elPeted not to pk•ad to thP complaint o!l 
file hPrein, and eonsented that a <kfanlt be taken agaim;t 
him and the rnattPr h1· ~-wt down for h<>aring at an:· tiuw 
conveniPnt to tlw Court an<l in any <·01mty of th<· Statl' 
of Utah; th<' Plaintiff' lia\·ing intr0<lt1<·<·d <·viclPn<·<· i11 ~1111· 
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port of thP complaint, and the Court being fully advised 
in tlH· pn•rnises, and having heretofore entered its Find-
ings of Fad and Cone]m;iom; of Law, now therefore, 
fi1 IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
D 1£CRKI£D that the Bonds of Matrimony heretofore ex-
i:-;ting between Plaintiff and Defendant be and the same 
an• hereby dissolved and the marriage relationship be-
tween the Plaintiff and th1• Defendant be and the same 
i:-; lwrehy terminated. 
lT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECRE1£D that the Plaintiff is awarded the care, cus-
tody and control of the minor children of the parties 
lwreto, to-wit: Richard Ray Crofts, a son, age 16, and 
Tina Marie Crofts, a daughter, age 15. Expressly award-
ing the Defendant the right to visit said children at all 
reasonable times and places. 
I'L' IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
D1£CREED that the Defendant shall assume, pay, and 
discharge all of the outstanding family obligations of 
the parties hereto including the outstanding note and 
mortgage upon tht' home property owned by the parties. 
IT IS FUR'l'HER ORDl£Rl£D ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff 
as temporary and pennanent alimony the sum of $150.00 
1wr month and the further sum of $150.00 per month 
for the support of the minor children of the parties 
lwrdo, wliieh alimony and :-;tqJport payments shall eom-
111Pn<"l' on or lwfon· the lUth <la.\· ot' l\o\·emlier l!:Jli~ and 
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shall continue until the minor childn;n individually reach 
their ages of majority. In the event a child reaches the 
age of majority, the support money herein provided 
shall be reduced $75.00 per month. Also in the event of 
re-ma,rriage of the Plaintiff herein, the alimony provided 
shall terminate. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that the Plaintiff is awarded as a permanent, 
complete and final settlement of her right::; in the prop-
erty of the Defendant, the total sum of $10,000.00, which 
sum shall be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff out 
of profits arising from business interests held by the 
Defendant and which IJrofits are actually distributed and 
received by the Defendant and shall be i11nnediatPly due 
and payable out of the sale of business assets of the De-
fendant to third parties and actual receipt by the Defend-
ant of said sale proceeds. Said amount shall be payable 
at the rate of 50 per cent of the gross sale proceeds until 
said $10,000.00 has been paid in full. Further, the De-
fendant shall have the option of prepaying any part of 
the amount provided herein. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED ANll 
DECREED that the Defendant shall assume and pay all 
Court costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection · 
with this action. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED ANll 
DECREED that the Plaintiff is awarded possession of 
the 1961 Pontiac sedan automobile, together with the 
furniture and furnishings owrn~d hy thP parties hereto 
-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
now in the home of the parties in Panguitch, Utah. ]j-,ur-
ther, the Plaintiff is awarded the possession, use, and 
oecn1iancy of tl11:• horne and home property owned by the 
parties located in Panguitch, Garfield County, State of 
Ftah, and specfically described as follows: 
'l'he East 4o2 feet of the South 6 chains of the 
Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 29, Township 34 South, Range 5 West, 
Salt Lake M(:'ridian, containing 4.2 acres, more or 
less. The East 5 chains thereof being in Panguitch 
Town Survey. 
Which vossession is to be held by the Plaintiff so long 
as she desires to use said home for personal living. In 
the event the home is sold to a third party, the equities 
realized from the sale of said property are to be equally 
divided between Plaintiff and the Defendant. The home 
property shall be continued in joint ownership between 
the Plaintiff and Defendant until said ownership is ter-
minated by a sale to a third party as is herein provided. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
D~CREED that thl:' Decree of this Court shall become 
final within three months after the date of its entry 
upon the records and from the filing hereof with the 
Clerk of the above entitled Court. 
DATED this 16th day of October, A.D. 1962. 
s/ jj-,ERDINANDtRICKSON 
District Judge 
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